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ABSTRACT: In this paper the real life operation of ULCS (Ultra Large Container Ships) is presented from the point of 
view of shipmasters. The paper provides interpretation of results of questionnaire filled by masters of large container 
ships during Tools for Ultra Large Container Ships (TULC) EUI FP7 project. This is done in a way that results of 
questionnaire are further reviewed and commented by experienced master of ULCS. Following phenomena are subject 
of questionnaire and further discussed in the paper: parametric rolling, slamming, whipping, springing, green water 
and rogue waves. Special attention is given to the definition of rough sea states as well as to measures that ship masters 
take to avoid them as well as to the manoeuvring in heavy seas. The role of the wave forecast and weather routing 
software is also discussed. 
KEY WORDS: Ultra large container ships (ULCS); Ship operation; Weather avoidance; Slamming; Green water; Whipping; 
Springing; Parametric rolling; Rogue waves. 
INTRODUCTION  
Development of ships for container transport is very fast. During last ten years those ships are “growing” tremendously. 
Each new ship is actually a prototype for which there is no feedback or previous experience on how she behaves in “real life”. 
This fact puts the masters of those ships in difficult positions where they need a lot of knowledge and intuition to be able to 
predict the response of a ship in any particular situation. Therefore, their experience is very precious to their colleagues as well 
as to ship designers.  
The project of the container ship has evolved through the history and they became larger and more efficient. In the 1980-s 
maximal container ship size was 4,500-5,000 TEU (twenty feet equivalent units), mainly because of the limitation on breadth 
and length imposed by the lock chambers of the Panama Canal. In 1990-s a new transportation net without using the Panama 
channel was developed, marking the creation of the new Post-Panamax type. Container ships with capacity of up to 10,000 
TEU belong to this category. Vessels with capacity of 10,000-14,500 TEU represent Very Large Container Ships (VLCS) or 
New-Panamax, as they will be able to pass through expanded Panama Canal. The latest generation of container ships is called 
Ultra Large Container Ships (ULCS), with capacities exceeding 14,500 TEU, and has a tendency to increase (Fig. 1). This 
tendency is most evident within the new project of large container ship with 18,000 TEU, which is currently being built 
(http://www. worldslargestship. com). Some shipyards are already capable of building even larger container ships, but other 
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restrictions such as width of the Worlds important channels, port depths and infrastructure will have a decisive role for 
realization of these projects in the future. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Ultra large container ship. 
 
These large ships represent a challenge in the design process, where a significant role play estimation of design loads and 
responses to these loads. Particular problem represent fact that dimensions of ULCS are outside the margin of the classification 
society’s rules and those are not readily applicable. Namely, rules are to a great extent based on the past experience, while such 
experience with ULCSs simply does not exist. New computational methods accounting for different hydroelastic responses of 
these ships are attempting to be used in their design. Such complex numerical methods are still under development and safety 
margin resulting from their implementation is actually unknown. Confidence in application of new computational methods may 
be improved by comparison with model tests and full scale measurements, but outcomes of these are also subjected to the 
various uncertainties (Hughes and Paik, 2010). 
Hydroelastic vibratory phenomena springing and whipping are the most important consequence of the continuous increase 
in the ship length and low stiffness of the hull girder. Springing is the steady-state resonant response, caused by the overlapping 
of the encounter frequency and the natural vibration frequency. Springing increases accumulated fatigue damage especially in 
quartering and bow seas when resonance may occur with first mode of coupled torsional-horizontal vibrations having rather 
low natural frequency. Other important vibratory response is whipping, which can be defined as transient elastic vibration of the 
ship hull girder due to slamming. Although whipping response can contribute to the accumulated fatigue damage, whipping is 
in the first place important for the verification of the ultimate bending moment capacity of the hull girder. The reason for that is 
that whipping response may significantly increase the wave frequency vertical wave bending moment (Storhaug, 2009).  
Lifetime extreme values of both wave frequency wave bending moments and whipping bending moments are influenced by 
the operational parameters related to the heavy weathers. Extreme wave loads and consequently shipping safety are predomi-
nantly determined by frequency of encountering heavy seas and also by manoeuvres that ship master undertakes if ship is 
caught in the bed weathers. Frequency of encountering heavy seas depends on the weather routing policy of the shipping 
company and also on the procedures of the shipmaster to predict and avoid encountering of the heavy weather. Heavy weather 
manoeuvring is almost entirely under influence of the ship master, i.e. his voluntary decision to change course and/or ship speed 
in situations when safety of ship or cargo are in danger. Rerouting of the vessel is a crucial issue as it affects the wave induced 
loads as well the economy of the transport. For ULCS, the effect on wave induced loads is further amplified by the fact that 
whipping loads are extremely sensitive to the ship speed (Tuitman, 2010). 
Having recognized crucial importance of the voluntary human actions for the extreme wave loads of containerships, it 
becomes clear need of interviews and discussions with ship masters (Guedes Soares, 1990). The purpose of the present paper is 
to clarify some aspects of decisions that captain of ULCS take with respect to issues of heavy weather avoidance and ma-
noeuvring in heavy weather. The paper describes results of the questionnaire performed during EU FP7 project TULCS and 
provides further clarification of results by one of experienced masters of ULCS. From the 40 questionnaire sent to the ship-
masters of containerships of over 4,000 TEU capacity, 23 answers were usable for analysis and conclusions. Questions are 
related to the definition of heavy weather and to the criteria for heavy weather avoidance as well as to the manoeuvres 
undertaken in the heavy weather. The questionnaire consists of 16 questions. The most of them have multiple choice and few 
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(three) of them require that the captain of the ship explains his observations. Some issues include both multiple choice answer 
and further clarification. Special attention is given to the phenomena that are specifically important for ULCSs as slamming, 
whipping and springing. The main contribution of the present study to the state of the art is more clear definition of design 
criteria for ULCS that include operational aspects of these ships. Such criteria, although important, presently do not exist.  
The problems during exploitation of ULCS in everyday work have been reported in many areas, but mainly in navigation 
on bed weather and port handling. During navigating in higher sea states a lot of cases of excessive loads are reported. That 
threatens the safety and complicates the work. A particular problem is the accurate determination of the time required for a 
single trip. Today this problem is not only important from the economic point of view but also because of the recently intro-
duced limitations of greenhouse gases emissions. In these cases the help of an onboard integrated decision support system is 
very important. During the ship's stay in port the manoeuvring problems are often as well as the excessive values of wind 
forces due to large exposed areas. The paper is organized in following way. After introduction, literature survey describing 
state-of-the-art of the modelling of heavy weather avoidance and manoeuvring is provided. Literature survey of operational 
restrictions of “traditional” ships is important, as the ULCS do not have only the specific issues due to high hull flexibility, but 
they also keep the issues already known for smaller and conventional vessels. In the next section, main operational aspects of 
ULCS are reviewed in a way that results from the questionnaire are interpreted and commented by the experienced ship 
master. Finally, the work ended by conclusions and directions for the future research.  
LITERATURE SURVEY AND STATE-OF-THE-ART OF THE MODELLING OF HEAVY WEATHER AVOI-
DANCE AND MANOEUVRING  
The influence of human action on extreme wave-induced loads, which is the focus of the present paper, may be divided into 
two parts: 
- Changes in shipping route in order to avoid heavy seas, 
- Master’s actions in heavy seas. 
The avoidance of heavy weather is partially taken into account in ship design by accepting Global Wave Statistics (GWS) 
as the source of the wave data (Hogben et al., 1986). Data in GWS are obtained by the observations from merchant ships that 
sail along standard trading routes. In that way, geographical areas with the most severe weather conditions are implicitly 
avoided in the analysis (Guedes Soares, 1996). However, in the extrapolation procedure for estimating extreme wave loads, 
large significant wave heights with very low probability of occurrence are nevertheless taken into account, counteracting in that 
way the advantage of using GWS data (Moan et al., 2006a). In real ship operation, such sea states with small probability of ex-
ceedance are often avoided, because most of ship masters receive and take into account weather forecast and other information 
relevant for the safe navigation.  
The avoidance of heavy weather during ship design process may be modelled by modifying the original wave scatter 
diagrams obtained from GWS. The modifications can be done by truncating the probability density function of the significant 
wave heights at limiting value HSlim. The probability of the truncated area should then be added to the sea states bellow the 
limiting significant wave heights. Moan et al. (2006a) proposes 3 methods to modify the original scatter diagram:  
- To add the probability of the truncated area just below limiting significant wave height HSlim, 
- To add the probability of the truncated area uniformly bellow HSlim , 
- To allow a small probability of encountering sea states above HSlim by reducing the tail of the probability density function. 
The truncated probability is then distributed uniformly below HSlim. 
First method approximates situation where the ship master avoids the heavy weather by manoeuvring the vessel into just 
calmer sea states. The second method is represented by the assumption that the sea state forecasts are available to the master and 
that rerouting is made. The last option accounts the fact that the significant wave heights higher than HSlim cannot be absolutely 
avoided in the reality (Moan et al., 2006a).  
Besides the selection of the modification method of the wave scatter diagram, the crucial question is the choice of an 
appropriate limiting significant wave height HSlim. According to the report of ISSC 2006, the operational limits for con-
tainerships are about 10.5 m and 6m for full load and ship in ballast respectively (Moan et al., 2006b). The effect of opera-
tional limit on the long-term extreme bending moments of 9,200 TEU containership is studied by Ćorak et al. (2013). They 
applied an approximate method to account for whipping effects in the long-term distribution and concluded that truncation 
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of the scatter diagram can lead to the reduction of the long-term extreme combined (wave and whipping) bending moments 
by more than 20%.  
The joint probability distribution of the significant wave heights and mean zero-crossing periods is used to model the sea 
environment in the long term. As the marginal distribution of the significant wave heights, the three-parameter Weibull distri-
bution is selected, while for the conditional distribution of the mean zero-crossing periods, the log-normal distribution is 
employed. Parameters of these distributions for each of wave zones in GWS are provided by Bitner-Gregersen et al. (1995).  
When the ship is caught in heavy seas, there are two manoeuvres that the ship master can undertake to avoid excessive ship 
rolling and hull damage (Guedes Soares, 1990). These are: 
- Changing course from beam seas to head or following seas, 
- Voluntary speed reduction. 
The course changes in heavy weather are mainly to avoid the ship capsizing or excessive ship rolling amplitudes that may 
interfere with normal working activities on board (Guedes Soares, 1990). Consequently, the probability of head seas is much 
higher in heavy weather than in normal sea conditions. However, this is valid only for smaller ships (less than about 200m in 
length). For large ships, the course changes in heavy weather are not so frequent. The explanation for this finding could be that 
the masters of large ships feel safe even in rather rough seas.  
Another important manoeuvre in rough seas is the speed reduction. This action is not dependent on the ship size (Guedes 
Soares, 1990). The reasons for speed reduction may generally be divided into two categories (Dubrovsky, 2000): 
- Natural reasons, such as the added resistance of wind and waves, change of submerged part of the hull, change of wake 
field and loss of thrust, 
- Technical or “design” reasons that are controlled by the shipmaster, such as very large motion amplitudes, velocities and 
accelerations, slamming, green seas, overload of the main engine. 
The natural reasons influence the ship speed at relatively low significant wave heights, while in heavy seas the shipmaster 
decides whether to reduce speed. There is no strict rule that determines under which conditions the shipmaster would reduce the 
speed, so various authors have proposed different criteria (Dubrovsky, 2000).  
Speed reduction curve for container ships is proposed by ABS (2010). According to ABS (2010), full speed is maintained 
up to significant wave height of 6 m. Then, speed is reduced to 75% of full speed. At significant wave height of 9 m, speed is 
further reduced to 50% of the full speed. Finally, at significant wave height of 12 m, speed is reduced to the 25% of the full 
speed, which is the minimum speed to maintain ship manoeuvrability. The effect of the speed reduction is analysed by Ćorak et 
al (2013) on 9,200 TEU containership. They found that the ABS speed reduction curve may reduce the long-term combined 
(wave and whipping) BM by about 18% compared to the constant ship speed of 15 knots. The speed reduction profile which is 
constructed based on ship operability analysis can reduce the combined BM by about 21%. This clearly demonstrates impor-
tance of appropriate speed reduction profile in ship structural design.  
In the recent years, Decision Support Systems (DSS) are developed to estimate effects of course and speed changes statistics 
on the most critical wave-induced ships extreme responses and fatigue damage accumulation. Such systems are often based on 
extensive instrumentation installed on board of new-build ships, which are used for continuous monitoring of engine and hull 
performance, for voyage performance and evaluation, etc. DSS is especially important for voyages of long duration without 
opportunity to seek shelter (Moan et al., 2006). The development of operator guidance systems is nowadays based on numerical 
models that introduce probabilistic and risk-based approaches (Hirdaris et al., 2014). It is to be noted that the on-site estimation 
of sea state parameters at the location of an advancing ship forms a crucial and fundamental problem to which a perfect solution 
has not been found yet (Hirdaris et al., 2014). 
DSS may be divided on DSS for strategic and DSS for tactical decisions. The former systems are intended for strategic 
decisions as route planning, while the latter are related to the rerouting, i.e. the manoeuvring in heavy weather. A consistent 
risk based concept for a DSS which will support a master and his crew in making tactical decisions is presented by Bitner-
Gregersen and Skjong (2009). The presented DSS was intended to provide information and guidance by offering an eva-
luation of probabilities and consequences, giving insight into the uncertainty of the information and into the risk related to 
relevant hazards. It is based on the modern reliability methodology and addresses uncertainties related to environmental 
models, load predictions, ship data and response calculations. Further development toward practical application of the con-
cept is presented by Papanikolau et al. (2014). That study presented recent advances in implementing uncertainty models for 
the development of the modern decision support systems as guidance to ship’s master.  
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ULCS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A MASTER 
The questionnaire is performed during EU FP7 project TULCS. From the 40 questionnaire sent, 23 masters of large con-
tainerships (over 4,000 TEU) filled questionnaire. The masters have been asked to report, on an anonymous basis, their 
behaviour in situations that are supposed to be harsh for container ships. The questionnaire consists of 16 questions. Results are 
analysed with the aid of one of experienced masters of ULCSs who helped in clarification and understanding of answers.  
Familiarity of ship masters with different phenomena relevant for ULCSs 
The first question in questionnaire was related to the familiarity of mariners with physical phenomena relevant for ULCS. 
Results indicate that slamming, whipping and green water on deck are actually the most often experienced by ship masters. 
Thus, 14, 11 and 10 out of 23 masters encountered slamming, whipping and green water respectively. However, it is surprising 
that parametric rolling is almost unknown problem, as only 1 out of 23 captains declared to encounter that phenomenon. Steady 
state springing vibrations are also rarely identified (5 out of 23) as well as rogue waves (4 out of 23). It is questionable if 
masters can distinguish all these phenomena and clearly identify each of them. Definition of rogue waves may be particularly 
misinterpreted as master may think of freak waves as large waves inside the storm. If it is clearly stated that rogue waves are 
large waves which are not related to the weather conditions, i.e. that they can appear in relatively calm weather, then such 
phenomenon is practically unknown to the shipmasters. However, explanation of rogue wave phenomenon may require some 
elaboration and possibly showing some photographs to shipmasters in order to clarify what is being asked. That approach is 
undertaken by Buckley (2005) when, in addition to the questionnaire, an interview with masters and mates has been accom-
plished. Only after detailed description of requested events and after showing photos, mariners eventually recalled that they had 
seen “something similar”. 
Definition of heavy weather 
The next two questions were about definition of the heavy weather. Almost all of shipmasters identify height of waves as 
the most important parameter for shipping safety. However, most of them indicate that wave period may also be critical for 
definition of heavy seas. Although not explicitly stated, it is probably related to the occurrence of the resonance in the beam sea 
conditions. Most of shipmasters find also that wind speed is rather disturbing and may influence safety of the ship and 
containers. All shipmasters indicated that heavy weather conditions start when significant wave height reaches 6-8 meters. 
Results are in relatively good agreement with finding reported by ISSC 2006, that the operational limits for containerships are 
about 10.5 m and 6 m for full load and ship in ballast respectively (Moan et al., 2006b). Although it would be expected that 
definition of heavy weather depends on ship heading angle, that influence could not be identified from the obtained results. It is 
to be noted that results of questionnaire agree very well with guidance of ABS (2010) that speed reduction begins at the 
significant wave height of 6 m. It is not known from the questionnaire, however, what happens at significant wave heights 
above 8 m. There are two problems related to such most severe sea states. Firstly, encountering such severe seas is so rare event 
that it is lost in any statistical treatment of results. Secondly, ship found is such extreme conditions are exposed to the high risk 
of structural damages or losing cargo. In addition, each master who has once experienced the destructive force of the storm 
develops the great respect for the power of nature and, as a rule, tries to avoid any similar experience. Therefore, the majority of 
masters avoid heavy seas by modifying the route or simply waiting for the storm to pass. If they passed through such storm they 
do not feel very comfortable to recognize that. The reason is that masters are always the main responsible persons for their 
crews and ships and they, if recognize that the ship was found in the danger, eventually need to answer the unpleasant question: 
why that dangerous weather condition has not been avoided?  
Usage of weather forecasts and weather routing systems 
All shipmasters declared to use weather forecast that is updated on the daily basis. Also, 21 of 23 masters are using some of 
weather routing systems. Some of systems used are based only on sea states (Bridge, Bon Voyage (Fig. 2)) while some of them 
are based on ship responses and therefore are ship specific (Octopus) (Fig. 3). Two third of the seamen answered that they 
would give absolute priority to the ship safety, i.e. that they would ignore any time constraint and commercial reasons if they 
should pass through zones with heavy weather conditions. However, one third of the interviewed masters would at least re-
consider warning of weather forecasts to meet schedule. Influence of weather routing on shipping safety was commented by 
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Faulkner in his discussion to the report of ISSC Committee “Environment” (Faulkner, 1997) as: “Weather routing of ships, 
which was introduced primarily to safeguard ships against extreme sea conditions, is not working satisfactory. Many mariners 
are quite sceptical about it, and ship masters often find that weather routing tries to safeguard charter arrival requirements rather 
than ship safety. One should also remember that computer assisted accidents do occur.” Overconfidence in weather routing may 
lead not only to the loss of containers on board, but it could have disastrous consequences. Typical example is capsize bulk 
carrier MV Derbyshire, sank in the North West Pacific during typhoon Orchid in September 1980. The trace of the typhoon was 
rather unpredictable, as Orchid executed three high-speed conditionally unstable cyclonic loops that could be one of the 
possible causes of foundering (Faulkner, 1998). Prudent shipmaster would not fully rely to the weather routing or long-term 
forecast, but will permanently monitor actual sea conditions and short-term forecasts. Safety of people as well as ship and the 
cargo is of the ultimate importance for the shipmasters and shipowners. Captains testify that they are very rarely or never 
exposed to the pressures of shipowners to keep strict schedule at the expense of safety. The lost of each container means 
downgrading of the company as well as the master as the most responsible person for the ship safety.  
 
 
Fig. 2 Marine voyage optimization system BVS7. 
 
     
Fig. 3 Decision support system Octopus.  
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One example of heavy weather avoidance by master who is using weather routing system is presented in Fig. 4. Ship left 
Mediterranean Sea on 04th January at 4AM on her route toward Southampton. Distance between Gibraltar and Southampton 
reads 1191NM, that takes 69 hours assuming average speed of 17.3 kn. Weather routing software predicted ship position after 
20 hours, i.e. on midnight between 4th and 5th January 2014, as presented in Fig. 4 left. So far, ship would cross 356NM, while 
in that time she would encounter wind seas of 2.2 m and swell of 7.9 m. Combined wave height is thus estimated to 8.2 m. 
Waves would predominantly come from portside inducing high ship rolling and such waves already deserve attention and 
caution of ship master. Predicted ship position and wave situation 36 hours later are shown in Fig. 4 right. On 06th January at 
noon, ship would cross in total 962NM, with 230NM still to go. According to the meteorological prediction, ship in that time 
would encounter wind waves of 4.3 m and swell of 8.9 m, while the combined wave height is estimated to 9.8 m. As the pre-
dominant wave direction is beam seas, 9.8 m is the wave height that prudent ship master would unconditionally avoid. As may 
be seen from Fig. 4 right, storm center with wave heights of above 13 m is rather close to the ship track. By taking into account 
uncertainty in meteorological predictions that are done for several days in advance, it could happen that ship is caught by storm 
centre and consequently shipmaster decided to wait for better conditions in one of safe ports close to Gibraltar. Thus, master 
waited for three days before forecast was favourable. Obviously, there was some delay in schedule arrival, which partially could 
be overcome by imposing higher speed. But in principle, master should not be very concerned by delay, especially if delay is 
anticipated and if the port authorities are informed on time about that. Very often ships arrive in time but they have to wait 
before entering the port because of traffic congestion or some other reasons. Conclusion is that safety of ship and cargo is on the 
first place. It should be mentioned that presented manoeuvring was possible because ship could wait in safe place. However, for 
route in the North Atlantic such heavy weather avoidance would be difficult (Moan et al., 2006a). 
 
    
Fig. 4 Heavy weather situation in Biskay Bay. 
Criteria for course and speed changes 
Next couple of questions was related to the response criteria for heavy weather manoeuvring. Most of shipmasters indi-
cated the rolling angle as the most important criterion for manoeuvring. Actions are undertaken when rolling angle amplitude 
exceeds about 18 degrees. Moreover, it seems that high ship stability represent a serious problem because of short natural 
period which makes rolling very unpleasant. With that respect, natural rolling period is obviously very important parameter, as 
large amplitudes are related to the resonant phenomenon when wave period becomes equal to the rolling period. Therefore, 
except wave height, wave period is also important parameter to decide about heavy weather manoeuvring. According to the 
statements of ship masters the heading angle could be changed by 25° to 30° at least. The change in heading should be made 
in the direction in order to face the waves. It is likely that in the case of the excessive rolling angle, change of the heading is 
more important than the speed reduction.  
These results agree reasonably well with interviews of experienced shipmasters presented by Guedes Soares (1990). He 
concluded that in heavy seas it is necessary to treat speed reduction and course changes together. The relationship between these 
two variables depends on the initial heading. In head seas, speed reduction is much more frequent than course changes. In bow 
seas, both occur equally often. With increasing seas, the tendency will be to decrease speed and to have head or following seas. 
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The final action reported by Guedes Soares (1990) is to stop engines and just let ship heave to. However, authors of the present 
paper consider that such situation should never happen as ship will be naturally driven by wind and waves to the beam seas. 
Such situation is considered as the most unfavourable and should be avoided in any case and therefore some minimal mano-
euvring speed should always be maintained.  
Although, it should be stated that present-day containerships are basically safe, even in such extreme situations. This is true 
if stability is carefully checked and limitations of weight and number of containers on deck are respected. The example of 
accident of ALP China is often cited as a proof of containership safety. That Post Panamax container ship survived a 24 hour 
hurricane, for one hour even with a total black out on board. Although some containers are lost and some overturned on board, 
this example if often cited as a proof of basic safety of these ships (Payer, 2001).  
Next criterion for manoeuvring is the slamming. However, there is no clear threshold slamming frequency when mano-
euvring would occur. Authors believe that one single slamming impact would be enough warning to shipmaster to make some 
actions. In the case of slamming the course would be changed for 5 to 10 degrees with the first impact and shipmaster would 
wait and see what would be the ship response. The main reason why shipmasters change the course before speed lies in the fact 
that the course can be changed much faster. For comparison, the rate of change of 10 degrees of heading angle can be achieved 
in a minute. Within the same time, the number of main engine rpm can be reduced by approximately 0.7. The problem which is 
identified here is related to the definition of slamming for containerships. Slamming can be defined as an impulsive load with 
high pressure peaks that occurs during impact between a body and water. Generally, three types of slamming loads exist; flat 
bottom slamming, bow flare slamming and stern slamming (Hughes and Paik, 2010). Bottom slamming occurs when the 
relative displacement at any section exceeds the local draught and the ships bottom undergoes a severe hydrodynamic impact 
on re-entry. The impact is sufficiently rapid and intense with very short duration and long decay time. Master can easily feel and 
detect such impact. Bow flare slamming is caused by a rapidly decreasing angle of the bow sections with the horizon, both in 
the transverse and in the longitudinal directions. Unlike bottom slamming, impact load due to bow flare slamming has weaker 
intensity and longer duration time with a short decay. It is therefore possible that shipmaster less clearly identify bow flare 
slamming compared to the bottom slamming. It could happen that, as a consequence, manoeuvring with respect to bow flare 
slamming occurs with the some delay. Due to small probability of occurrence of bottom slamming and highly pronounced flare, 
in the case of large container ships, only bow flare slamming is important (Faltinsen, 1990). Stern slamming often occurs when 
containerships are moored near ports, as a consequence of swell.  
Implications of cargo handling on ship safety 
Except manoeuvring relating to weather conditions, safety of container ships may be affected by the still water loads, which 
are the consequence of the distribution of containers (Fig. 5). The distribution of containers on board depends on many factors. 
Captains get a loading/unloading plan before arrival at port and they can make comments and objections to certain extend. It's 
not easy to make a plan for loading. The containers distribution must be such that: it follows the voyage plan of loading/ 
unloading; does not cause excessive structural loads; allows easy access to refrigerated containers; meets the rules of income-
patible cargoes. In addition, the captain must take care to avoid unnecessary maneuvers of harbor cranes that significantly in-
crease the cost of loading/unloading. It is interesting to cite observations of ISSC 2009, Committee of Quasi Static Response 
(Aksu et al., 2009), with respect to still water loads of containership Napoli, which suffered structural failure of hull girder 
while on passage through the English Channel on January 2007. Two points may be extracted from Committee conclusions in 
relation to the cargo handling safety issues:  
- There were discrepancies between the declared weights and actual weights of containers onboard. Although these weight 
discrepancies probably could not have caused alone the hull girder failure, it would have contributed to the reduction of 
the safety margin between the total bending moment experienced and the strength of the hull. The longitudinal hull girder 
stresses cannot be accurately controlled unless weight of containers is determined before embarkation.  
- The vessel had left port with bending moments in excess of the permissible seagoing maximum value. This was a result of 
a draught with enough under clearance so that the vessel could leave the port at any tide condition. It was highlighted that 
the practice of arriving and departing from berths, in a loaded condition that was in excess of permissible seagoing maxi-
ma, was potentially detrimental to safety but is commonplace within the container ship industry.  
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Fig. 5 Loading of containers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The presented paper provides clarification of some aspects of decisions that captain of ULCS take with respect to issues of 
heavy weather avoidance and manoeuvring in heavy weather. The masters are just gaining the experience at such huge ships 
and need a lot of knowledge and intuition to be able to predict the response of a ULCS in any particular situation. Their ex-
perience is very precious to their colleagues as well as to ship designers. This research is performed by analysing questionnaire 
filled by masters of containerships and by discussing outcome of questionnaire by one experienced master of ULCS. Findings 
of the research may be summarized as follows:  
- Slamming, whipping and green water are known phenomena experienced by almost all captains. However, parametric rolling, 
springing and rogue waves are very rarely identified. It can be recommended to amend questionnaire by interviews where 
masters could be better explained about those issues. 
- All shipmasters indicated that heavy weather conditions start when significant wave height reaches 6 - 8 meters. At such sea 
states manoeuvres are required.  
- Majority of masters do not have large confidence on the weather routing or long-term forecast, but permanently monitor actual 
sea conditions and short-term forecasts. 
- The most important criterion for rerouting is the rolling angle of about 18 degrees, when course would change toward head or 
following seas. In head seas, single events of slamming and green water are generally enough to reduce speed or to adjust the 
course.  
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